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Bringing Individuals Back into 
Sociology. Three Aspects of Cohesion in 
Dutch Society During the 20th Century 
Wout Ultee 
Which Rational Choice Approach to Which Sociological Questions? 
Functionalism developed into a theory dysfunctional to sociology. His-
torical materialism did not materialize as an alternative paradigm and 
became a historical phenomenon. Nowadays "rational choice" is the re-
quired approach to sociological questions. However, Goldthorpe in the 
present volume pinpoints an unwholesome disposition among propo-
nents of "rational action theory" (RAT), a label which is a bit more inclu-
sive than "rational choice approach". Distinguishing between explaining 
a particular set of research findings and solving a theoretical problem per 
se, Goldthorpe contends that RAT until now has eschewed the explana-
tion of regularities w:learthed by the quantitative analysis of large-scale 
data-sets (QAD). Yet for sociology to progress, RAT-theories must focus 
on QAD-findings. In the present chapter, concerned in general with the 
relation between theory and research in sociology, and in particular with 
the interplay of various rational choice approaches and the statistical re-
sults of empirical social investigations, I apply RAT to QAD-findings on 
Dutch society. 
Although RAT has been around for some decades, its proponents un-
til now have not said much about sociology's long-standing or classical 
questions. RAT-advocates to some extent exploit contemporary sociol-
ogy's proverbial lack of a core of subjects by dealing opportunistically 
with a heterogeneous list of subjects. They more or less take their pick 
when arguing in favor of their approach. However, for progress to oc-
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cur, an approach has to be convincing to impartial spectators, newcom-
ers, and established sociologists who maintain that sociology advances by 
hard-nosed data-analysis rather than ethereal theories. Avoiding easy tar-
gets helps. By taking illustrations from research on social stratification, 
Goldthorpe shows in this volume what RAT could and should do for a 
set of long standing issues within sociology. In the present chapter I take 
up the classical sociological question of cohesion (Ultee 1991) and analyse 
QAD-regularities which indicate the extent to which Dutch society was 
cohesive in various respects during the 20th century. 
Sociology~s questions address about features of society, while RAT-
answers apply to individuals. Until now much attention has been given to 
deriving macro-predictions from micro-premises. In my opinion the first 
step is to reformulate questions which treat societies as questions which 
refer explicitly to their inhabitants. A possible disadvantage of such a 
procedure is that it tailors down a macro-question. Proponents of an au-
tonomous macro-sociology are likely to stress this. I will show, however, 
that this approach yields interesting follow-up questions. In the present 
chapter I enrich three questions regarding the cohesion of Dutch society 
during the 20th century by "bringing individuals back in" (Homans 1964). 
Having said what the present chapter is about, I hasten to add what it 
does not do. The prime purpose of this chapter is neither to test explana-
tions nor to propose a theory. It mainly specifies questions. It is commonly 
accepted in sociology that empirical research is not to be undertaken on 
its own, but has to be preceded by theory. I argue that theory construction 
has to be attuned to specific questions, and that the articulation of ques-
tions in sociology until now has not received the attention it deserves. The 
present chapter is primarily an exercise in formulating questions. 
Cohesion: Durkheimian and Individualistic Subquestions 
Hobbes raised the question of the war of all against all. Now, if people 
do not kill each other, they may be said to live in peace. But do they then 
live together peacefully? Societies with a low murder rate may differ in the 
extent to which their inhabitants are connected to one other. The extreme 
case of suicide indicates, according to Durkheim, a preference for death 
above living in the company of others. Thus, the Hobbesian problem of 
war and peace is a subquestion of the classical question of cohesion. So 
is the Durkheimian question of the propensity towards suicide within a 
population, and the Nisbetian one of the strength of the ties between the 
inhabitants of a society. In what follows I use RAT to enrich the classical 
question of societal cohesion. 
Individualistic approaches assume that people act by choosing in a ra-
tional way. One current version also presupposes that the resources peo-
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ple use when deciding include time and money. Hechter (1987:19) uses the 
latter assumption to derive indicators of solidarity between persons. They 
refer to the time people spend with each other and the money they spend 
on others. My specification of the problem of the cohesion of Dutch soci-
ety during the zoth century uses this distinction too. However, in the same 
way that Hobbes did not distinguish between living in peace and living 
together peacefully, Hechter with his stipulation that time and monE:y are 
resources which people employ to create solidarity, conflates "letting peo-
ple die" and "killing people" into one category. People may spend money 
on food for those who are hungry, but they can also let them go hungry. 
They can also spend money on weapons and then take their time killing 
others with these same weapons. Thus, my partitioning of the problem of 
cohesion suggests several subproblems. 
This chapter specifies three subquestions of the cohesion problem by 
using RAT. The first one concerns a feature of Dutch society before and 
after the Second World War: it is divided not so much in horizontal strata 
with better and worse living conditions, but in vertical pillars founded 
on specific denominations. The second question concerns the high per-
centage of Dutch Jews that did not survive the Second World War. My 
third question concerns the rise and demise of the solidarity of society in 
general with its weakest members as embodied in the regulations of the 
Dutch welfare state after the Second World War. The following presenta-
tion of these issues consists of a mixture of empirical analysis, theoretical 
explanation, and methodological commentary. To obtain an enriched re-
statements of problems, I complement encyclopedia dates with findings 
from administrative statistics and results of large-scale data-sets. 
The (De)Pillarization of the Netherlands 
Lijphart (1968) finds it puzzling that the Netherlands did not tum into 
a battlefield during the first decades of the zoth century. Catholics, Re-
formed Protestants, Re-reformed Protestants, and non-believers had sep-
aratE~ political parties, their own schools, newspapers, building societies, 
soccer clubs, trade unions and what not. Because Dutch society was pillar-
ized, its cohesion was weak. Lijphart poses the question how it is possible 
in a pillarized society that political issues continued to be decided by votes 
and not by violence. 
Why No Civil War? 
To answer this question, Lijphart proposes a theory of political elites. 
According to this theory, the Netherlands survived because the leaders of 
the pillars gathered from time to time to make wise decisions. Driven by 
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the fear of a long and bitter electoral battle by Protestants and Catholics 
against laws that grant governmental subsidies only to religiously neutral 
schools, the leaders of the political parties decided in 1913 to "pacify" the 
country by granting full subsidies to denominational schools, thus socially 
separating the denominations from one another. 
Lijphart's explanation is not very satisfactory. Common people do not 
follow their leaders so easily, and leaders are not that judicious. As Van 
den Doel (1979) showed, log-rolling explains state subsidies for denom-
inational schools. In 1913, the confessional parties supported general 
suffrage in exchange for socialist support for government-funded con-
fessional schools. This explanation of the production of one good not 
supported by a majority in parliament invokes another good whose pro-
duction is advocated by another political minority. I will present another 
"two-goods" explanation of an aspect of the cohesion of Dutch society 
later on. 
The Trend in (De)Pillarization Charted 
In the tradition of Lijphart, the problem of the rise and decline of the 
pillars turns into a question of the establishment and dissolution of con-
fessional political parties and other denominational organizations. A Re-
reformed Protestant party was founded in 1879, a Catholic one in 1904. 
They became part of a unified Christian party in 1977. A Catholic labor 
union was founded in 1909, and merged with a social-democratic one in 
1982. A separate Protestant union, founded in 1908, has survived. The 
first Catholic daily newspaper was founded in 1845; the last one ceased to 
exist in 197 4. The first Re-reformed Protestant daily appeared in 1872, and 
this paper is still being published. A Re-reformed Protestant university 
was founded in 1880, and a Catholic one in 1923. Both currently flourish. 
All in all, theRe-reformed Protestant pillar was erected before the Catholic 
pillar was built, and the Catholic pillar was the first to reel. Why did de-
pillarization occur in the Netherlands in the 1970s? This is, in my opinion, 
the wrong question. 
Upon inspection, the Lijphartien question of when the denominational 
organizations were founded and dissolved in the Netherlands, upon in-
spection turns out to be a question concerning organizations in a society. 
It is not about the inhabitants of a society who are, or are not, members 
of these organizations. Of course, corporate actors are the product of a 
founding act of natural persons, and Coleman (1982) broadened RAT by 
allowing for corporate actors next to natural persons. Yet the question of 
( de)pillarization encompasses more than a question of the birth and death 
of collective actors. The following list invokes the increasingly individu-
alistic nature of questions on pillarization in the Netherlands: 
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1. When were political parties for the separate denominations founded 
and dissolved? 
2. When did the vote for confessional parties peak? 
3. When was the relation between a person's denomination and his/her 
vote for a confessional party strongest? 
4. When were the chances of marriage between Catholics andRe-reformed 
Protestants highest? 
The first question pertains to a society and its denominations; the last 
question addresses the links between the inhabitants of a society and its 
religious organizations, addresses ties between two members of a society. 
Strictly organizational data answer the question of when pillarization 
(dis )appeared, but do not answer the question concerning the peak in pil-
larization. To answer the latter question, the question of pillarization has 
to be specified in more individualistic terms. One possible approach is 
to look at when the percentage of a country's inhabitants voting for de-
nominational parties was the highest. Column 2 of Table 12.1 answers 
this question. In 1925, for the first time in Dutch history, every man and 
woman had the right to vote. Pillarization was stable between that year 
and 1963, and decreased sharply afterwards. 
TABLE 12.1: (De)pillarizationand Vote 
Year (a) (b) 
1925 53 ? 
1937 55 ? 
1946 54 4.2 
1956 53 3.6 
1963 52 ? 
1967 47 3.2 
1971 40 2.6 
1972 35 2.5 
1977 36 2.6 
1981 35 3.1 
1982 34 2.9 
1986 38 2.1 
1989 39 2.2 
1994 27 2.6 
The question of (de)pillarization as (a) the question of the percentage of the vote for confes-
sional parties, and (b) as the relation between belonging to a denomination or not and voting 
for a confessional party or not as measured by log odds ratios; the Netherlands 1925-1994 
(the higher a log odds ratio, the stronger the relation between denomination and confessional 
vote) 
Sources: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1994) and Ultee et al. (1996) 
I shall bypass the question of why depillarization started in the 1960s. 
If the percentage of the population who were members of Catholic, 
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Reformed-Protestant or Re-reformed Protestant denominations decreased 
in the preceding decades and recently unchurched persons kept voting for 
a confessional party, depillarization was underway before the 1960s. Fur-
ther evidence of earlier depillarization would be provided if the percent-
age of denominationally affiliated persons rose while the confessional vote 
remained the same. If the percentage of unchurched voters did not change 
while the tendency of denominationally affiliated persons to vote confes-
sional decreased and that of non-affiliated voters to vote confessional in-
creased, that would also suggest earlier depillarization. Apparently, the 
question of the percentage of votes for confessional parties is not pitched 
closely enough to the individual level. 
More pertinent questions of (de)pillarization search for types of indi-
vidual voting patterns. One such question is that of the trend in the odds 
that people belonging to a denomination vote for a confessional rather 
than another party, compared to the odds that non-believers vote for the 
former rather than the latter party. Column 3 of Table 12.1 gives the trend 
in the log odds ratio for the relation between denomination and voting for 
a confessional party. The higher this log, the stronger the relation between 
these variables. Since surveys were conducted in the Netherlands before 
the Second World War, the figures in Column 3 of Table 12.1 do not cover 
the full 20th century. But the trend they portray is clear: depillarization 
started quite soon after the S~cond World War, and certainly not in the 
1970s, or even in the 1960s. 
Does the question concerning the odds of denominatially affiliated per-
sons to vote confessional rather than non-confessional, compared with 
those of persons without a denomination to do so, get at the heart of the 
matter? Until now my questions on depillarization, although involving 
individuals, pertained to links between individuals and corporate actors: 
people vote for parties. However, questions may be devised that do not 
involve these ties but that focus instead on relations between people. The 
latter approach accepts that questions of pillarization are subquestions of 
the cohesion problem. Given that marriage represents a strong tie between 
persons, what do data on religiously mixed marriages in the Netherlands 
during the 20th century suggest? Other things remaining equal, a higher 
incidence of religiously mixed marriages in a society increases its cohe-
sion. I measure the extent to which marriages take place between two 
denominations by log odds ratios. The higher a log, the more unequal the 
outcome of a competition between Catholic and Re-reformed Protestant 
men for Catholic rather than Re-reformed Protestant wives, and the less 
mixed the marriage. 
I chart the trend in marriages between the two most organizationally 
pillarized denominations in Table 12.2. It contains data for the whole 
of the Netherlands and for four of its major cities: Amsterdam, Utrecht, 
) 
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and Groningen in the North of the Netherlands, and Eindhoven in the 
South. I add data for cities since they come closer to forming the "mar-
riage market" of individuals than the Netherlands itself. The data refer to 
all marriages entered into in a certain year, not all existing marriages. Ta-
ble 12.2 provides a clear picture. To begin with, mixed marriage decreased 
between 1938 and 1955. Secondly, marriages between Catholics andRe-
reformed Protestants reached their nadir in 1955. Thirdly, mixed marriage 
rose a bit in the second part of the 1950s, more in the first part of the 1960s, 
and even more in the second part of the 1960s. Fourthly, the increase in 
mixed marriage levelled off in the 1980s. 
TABLE 12.2. (De)Pillarization and Marriage 
Year Amsterdam Utrecht Groning_en Eindhoven Netherlands 
1938 5.6 6.6 6.9 ? 8.2 
1940 5.9 5.3 9.1 ? 8.6 
1946 5.8 6.1 9.4 8.3 8.4 
1950 5.4 5.9 00 7.5 8.2 
1951 5.9 6.3 8.2 00 8.6 
1952 6.0 6.2 9.0 7.5 8.3 
1953 5.8 6.1 00 10.2 8.8 
1954 7.1 6.4 00 00 9.0 
1955 7.2 6.7 10.2 10.4 8.9 
1956 7.1 6.3 9.7 7.5 8.9 
1957 6.6 6.2 00 8.0 8.8 
1958 6.4 6.2 00 7.5 8.6 
1959 6.1 6.6 00 8.7 8.8 
1960 6.1 5.8 8.7 8.2 8.6 
1965 5.7 6.3 6.5 7.1 8.2 
1970 4.6 4.8 5.9 5.6 6.6 
1975 3.4 3.6 5.4 4.6 5.4 
1980 3.0 2.9 3.8 4.3 5.4 
1985 2.9 4.3 4.6 4.2 5.2 
The question of (de)pillarization as the question of marriages between Re-reformed Protes-
tants and Catholics; log odds ratios for all marriages concluded in a certain year in Amster-
dam, Utrecht, Groningen, Eindhoven, and the Netherlands, 1938-1945 (the higher a log odds 
ratio, the less mixed the marriage) 
Source: unpublished raw frequencies of Statistics Netherlands 
Depillarization Explained 
I am now in a position to raise the question of why pillars started reel-
ing at some point in time. The picture provided by my tables may seem 
messy, but it is not. When interpreting findings, I follow the rule that an-
swers to questions on societal features stated in such a way that they refer 
as strongly as possible to individuals, are to be preferred over answers to 
seemingly purely societal questions. The latter are less informative and 
less accurate than the former. The question that was phrased in terms 
) 
) 
195 
of Dutch society and its political parties received an answer maintaining 
that pillarization started around 1900, and ceased to exist in 1977. No an-
swer was provided on when pillarization was at its peak. The question 
on Dutch society, its political parties and the percentage of the vote for 
confessional parties received an answer attesting to a high plateau of pil-
larization until the mid 1960s, and a drop afterwards. According to the 
answer to the question on changes in Dutch society in connection with a 
person's denomination and his /her vote, depillarization was underway in 
the 1950s. The answer to the question concerning ties between individu-
als stipulates a decrease in mixed marriages until the mid-1950s and a rise 
afterwards. Thus, depillarization took off in the Netherlands in the mid-
1950s. The popular view that things started to change in the Netherlands 
in the mid-1960s fails to engage the level of the inhabitants of a society, 
and remain at the level of various organizations, hence possibly lagging 
behind developments. For people losing their religion or no longer view-
ing politics religiously, existing secular political parties are not always 
attractive. For new political parties to emerge, the number of potential 
breakaway voters must have become sufficiently large. 
Why did the denominations lose their hold on Dutch society? It is too 
easy to ascribe their waning influence to the rising level of education. Per-
haps secular education turns people into non-believers, but how could 
education in denominational schools do this? After all, since the First 
World War the denomLrtations tried to maintain their grip by providing 
full government-funding to denominational schools. That increased the 
attendance of confessional schools and initially resulted in less mixed mar-
riage. In the end, however, this strategy failed. 
My explanation is a "two-goods" one. Religion in the Netherlands dur-
ing the first part of the 20th century provided not only salvation in the 
hereafter. The Dutch government granted hardly any welfare, adhered 
to a law that old people without sufficient means had to be taken care 
of by their children, and supported the administration of welfare by the 
churches. When, after a provisional law in 1948, a law providing old-age 
pensions for every person above the age of 65 came into force in 1956, the 
churches stopped dispensing one of the material goods they had provided 
for several centuries. A law awarding social assistance in other circum-
stances came into force in 1965. According to my "two-goods" hypothe-
sis, these laws turned the churches of the Netherlands into collective ac-
tors that no longer provided the material good of income to persons in a 
stage of life that all persons would like to attain (everybody wants to live 
a long time), and this caused pillarization to decline in the Netherlands af-
ter the mid-1950s. My next case of enriching macro-questions by bringing 
individuals back in stems from the Netherlands during the Second World 
War. 
) 
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The War that Hitler Won-in Which the Dutch Were a Third Party 
It is generally accepted that the Second World War ended in a victory 
of the Allies over Germany. However, Hitler also waged war against 
the Jews and Hitler won that war. A comparison of various European 
countries with regard to the percentage of Jewish inhabitants who did not 
survive the Second World War raises the following question: why was 
the percentage of Dutch Jews that was killed higher than the percentages 
for other West-European countries, and close to those for Eastern Europe 
(Blom 1989)? This question may be viewed as a question about the weak 
cohesion of Dutch society under German occupation and the limited soli-
darity of Gentiles with Jews. When Jews were ordered to go to concentra-
tion camps in the Netherlands and then await their deportation to work 
camps in Poland, offers for hiding places were not forthcoming. How-
ever, when somewhat later during the Second World War Gentile Dutch 
men were ordered to work in factories in Germany to produce materials 
for the war, more places became available where these men could con-
ceal themselves. In addition, Dutch policemen, not only members of the 
Dutch National Socialist Party (NSB) or of the SS (Schutzstaffeln), rounded 
up Jews, and mayors of cities encouraged people to declare themselves 
as Jewish in accordance with the Nuremberg definition. Finally, Jews that 
went into hiding were sometimes betrayed by "ordinary" Dutchmen. 
The Dutch Paradox and its Subquestions 
Fein (1979) performed a quantitative analysis with countries as the unit 
of analysis, the percentage of Jewish inhabitants that died in the Second 
World War as the variable to be explained, and pre-war anti-Semitism and 
the presence of the SS as predictors. The results of this analysis deserve 
careful study. Not every country is exactly on the regression line, and 
the Netherlands is an outlier. This country with its relatively low pre-war 
anti-Semitism and its limited 55-presence had a higher percentage of mur-
dered Jews than predicted on the basis of these two pieces of information. 
Hence the Dutch Paradox: why were more Dutch Jews killed than the situ-
ation in the Netherlands would lead one to expect? 
Fein's analysis involving countries went as far as it could. However, 
if the causal factors he identified are indeed pivotal, they should explain 
not only differences between countries, but also differences between the 
municipalities within one country. Thus, the Dutch Paradox may be ad-
dressed in a roundabout way, by comparing for Dutch municipalities the 
percentages of Jews that did not survive the Second World War. For the 
various Dutch municipalities, lists have been preserved with the name, 
place and date of birth of the Jews who lived there in 1941 or 1942. Lists 
with the name, place and date of birth, and place and date of death of all 
\ ) 
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Dutch Jews killed in the Second World War also exist. In addition, files 
were compiled shortly after the Second World War on mayors and police-
men who collaborated with Germany. It is also known when most Dutch 
Jews were sent from Dutch camps to Polish ones. Finally, there are lists 
of Jewish survivors. Thus, the following attempt to enrich questions may 
· give rise to new empirical findings bearing on the Dutch Paradox. 
When restating the Dutch Paradox for municipalities, I use a RAT-
principle proposed by Boudon {1973) for a different topic. According to 
this precept, when accounting for the level of education attained by a per-
son, an explanation has to be devised that does not regard this level as 
the outcome of one big decision taken by a person, but as the accumu-
lated result of several smaller ones. An educational system has numerous 
branching points, and at each point decisions occur. Generalizing this 
idea, and applying this principle to the persecution of the Jews, the per-
centage of a country's or municipality's Jews killed in the Second World 
War is the result of human action, but not the outcome of one action by 
any person. This divides the Dutch Paradox into subquestions. To begin 
with, Jews had to register as Jews in the municipality where they lived. 
Secondly, those registered were ordered by local authorities to camps in 
the Netherlands. Those not following these orders and going into hiding 
may have been deported anyway. Those in the Dutch camps were or were 
not deported to Poland. Those arriving in Polish camps may have been 
killed at once, they may have lived for some time to die of exhaustion or 
disease, or they may have survived. In this way the following sequence of 
descriptive questions is obtained: 
1. What the percentage of Jews living in a municipality of the Netherlands 
was registered as Jewish? 
2. What the percentage of Jews registered in a Dutch town followed the 
first deportation orders to a Dutch camp? 
3. For each Dutch municipality, what the percentage of Jews in hiding was 
eventually deported to a Dutch camp? 
4. For each Dutch municipality, what the percentage of Jews in Dutch 
camps was deported to camps in Poland? 
5. For each Dutch municipality, what the percentage of Jews killed was 
upon arrival in a camp in Poland? 
6. For each Dutch municipality, what the percentage of Jews not immedi-
ately killed in a Polish camp survived the Second World War? 
Dutch Perpetrators and Dutch Bystanders 
After answering the descriptive questions just listed, explanatory ones 
may be raised. When addressing them, it is useful to replace a particular 
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RAT-assumption by a more realistic one. The old assumption amounts to 
the initial condition of two types of actors, in this case perpetrators and 
victims. Of course, in the case of the Netherlands, not only Hitler and 
the Germans were perpetrators, but also Dutch mayors and policemen. 
According to Hilberg (1992), bystanders formed a third type of actor in the 
destruction of European Jewry. Some people watched or turned their head 
during the persecution of the Jews, while others offered help. Yet others 
betrayed Jews that had gone into hiding. With a "three-actor" assumption 
Ultee and Flap (1996) derived the following hypotheses: 
1. in municipalities that had a mayor sympathetic to the German occupa-
tion, a higher percentage of Jews was registered as Jewish than in mu-
nicipalities with a mayor without such sympathies, and in the former 
municipalities the percentage of registered Jews that was deported was 
higher than in the latter, 
2. in municipalities with police agreeable to the German occupation, a 
higher percentage of registered Jews was deported upon first orders 
than in municipalities where police were not sympathetic, 
3. in municipalities where the NSB drew a higher percentage of the vote 
before the Second World War, the percentage of registered Jews that 
went into hiding and the percentage of Jews in hiding that remained 
undiscovered, was lower than in the municipalities where the NSB 
drew a smaller percentage of the vote, 
4. in municipalities where pillarization was stronger, the percentage of 
registered Jews going underground was smaller than in municipalities 
with weaker pillarization (assuming that when the difference between 
the percentage of the vote for non-confessional parties and the percent-
age of the population without a denomination is larger, pillarization is 
weaker): 
A first report on the tenability of these hypotheses concerning one as-
pect of the cohesion of Dutch society during the Second World War is Flap, 
Geurts and Ultee (1997). My next illustration of enriching questions on an 
aspect of the cohesion of Dutch society pertains to the period after the 
Second World War. 
Solidarity and the Welfare State: Giving and Receiving 
Studies on welfare states are clearly important for sociology's long-
standing question of stratification. Yet, when the number of unemployed 
and disabled persons grew sharply in the Netherlands in the early 1980s, 
the total level of benefits rose, and proposals were made to lower indi-
vidual benefits. At that time it was said that the solidarity underpinning 
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the welfare state was eroding. Was it really? It could be that a recipient 
of social benefits now receives less than before and that the amount of 
premium paid by an employed person rises. The latter does not indicate 
weaker solidarity. I add that the word solidarity may not be a good term, 
since it suggests voluntarism. However, social security is not charity. The 
expression cohesion therefore might be more appropriate than the term 
solidarity (used for instance by Baldwin 1990). 
Two Traditional but Possibly Misleading Questions 
Wilensky (1975) calculated the amount of social security benefits as 
a percentage of gross or net national income. Column 2 in Table 12.3 
presents the trend in the total level of social security benefits as a per-
centage of net national income in the Netherlands from 1952 and 1992. To 
ease computing, I assume that being employed and drawing benefits are 
mutually exclusive. According to Column 2 of Table 12.3, benefits peaked 
in 1983, dropped a bit until1989, and then rose again slightly afterwards 
without attaining the level of 1983. 
TABLE 12.3. Misleading Questions on Solidarity and the Welfare State 
Year (a) (b) 
1952 10 33 
1955 10 40 
1960 13 36 
1965 17 44 
1970 20 41 
1975 28 51 
1980 32 52 
1981 33 49 
1982 35 54 
1983 36 52 
1984 34 52 
1985 33 40 
1986 33 40 
1987 34 39 
1988 34 37 
1989 33 37 
1990 34 41 
1991 34 40 
1992 35 39 
The question of solidarity by way of the welfare state as (a) the misleading question of the 
percentage of net national income consisting of social security benefits and (b) the misleading 
question of the average income of a person receiving social security as a percentage of the 
average income of an employed person 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1994) 
This answer to the question of the trend in total social security bene-
fits as a percentage of national income may provide no more than a rough 
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indication of the year in which solidarity between employed persons and 
benefit recipients was maximal. After all, if the percentage of persons on 
benefits rises and individual benefit levels remain constant, the employed 
"give" more to the recipients taken as a whole, and thus show more soli-
darity. 
Korpi (1989) calculated the average income of a social security recipient 
as a percentage of the average income of an employed person. Column 3 
in Table 12.3 makes clear that in the Netherlands this percentage rose un-
til1982, dropped sharply until1989, to rise somewhat afterwards. Thus 
Column 3 provides a somewhat different picture than the first column. 
But does Column 3 say anything about cohesion? Social security bene-
fits are transmissions of money among individuals, though these trans-
fers are coerced by the state. If the figures in Column 3 of Table 12.3 do 
not change, and the number of people on benefits rises, then an employed 
person transfers a higher percentage of his /her income to people on social 
benefits. In addition, the transfer payment received by a person on social 
benefits could be financed by a higher or lower number of employed per-
sons. Questions on differences in income between the average person on 
social benefits and the average employed person do not provide an accu-
rate picture of cohesion. 
Two New Questions Providing a More Accurate Picture 
The question of how much money states spend on social security refers 
neither to the amount of benefits received by the average person living 
on social security, nor to the amount of social security premium paid by 
the average employed person. That is, this question is not investigated 
on an individualleve.l; the unit invoked is the government. The question 
concerning the income of the average benefits recipient compared to the 
income of an employed person does refer to persons paying social secu-
rity premiums and persons receiving social benefits. However, it pertains 
neither to the amount of money flowing from the average employed per-
son to all benefit recipients, nor to the money received by one person on 
benefits from one employed person as a percentage of the latter's income. 
That is, the flow of money is an asymmetric relation. When the state trans-
fers income, there are givers and there are receivers, and two questions on 
cohesion. 
Thus, two questions on social security premiums paid and social bene-
fits received should be posed, the answer to each question illuminating in 
its own way the issue of solidarity. The first question concerns the trend in 
the average amount of income "given" by an employed person to all social 
benefit recipients taken as a whole as a percentage of the average income 
of an employed person. This question quantifies the solidarity given by 
) 
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an employed person to all recipients taken together. The second question 
concerns the trend in the average amount "received" by a person on so-
cial benefits from one employed person (the average employed person) as 
a percentage of the average income of an employed person. This question 
quantifies the solidarity received by a social benefits recipient from the 
average employed person. 
TABLE 12.4. Solidarity and the Welfare State 
Year Employed Persons 
Total Income 
(djl. min) 
(=1) 
1952 13243 
1955 16598 
1960 21662 
1965 33938 
1970 59531 
1975 99289 
1980 153252 
1981 155385 
1982 157339 
1983 161861 
1984 168361 
1985 187277 
1986 193588 
1987 200780 
1988 203610 
1989 215238 
1990 223370 
1991 239919 
1992 254311 
(a)= i:~ = f 
(b)= 4;;;1 = 1;4 
Total Number 
(1000s) 
(=2) 
3711 
3948 
4089 
4380 
4504 
4425 
4538 
4128 
4381 
4303 
4298 
4505 
4592 
4659 
4728 
4767 
4855 
4931 
4987 
Benefit Recipients 
Total Income Total Number 
(djl. min.) (1000s) 
(=3) (=4) 
668 564 
1019 605 
2319 1203 
5553 1642 
11289 2057 
29661 2570 
52528 2982 
57845 3156 
64491 3355 
67999 3495 
68389 3357 
65633 3935 
66642 3953 
67160 4021 
68030 4082 
69252 4177 
79730 4239 
83081 4268 
86609 4321 
(a) (b) 
5 0.009 
6 0.010 
11 0.009 
15 0.010 
19 0.009 
30 0.012 
34 0.011 
37 0.012 
41 0.012 
42 0.012 
41 0.012 
35 0.009 
34 0.009 
33 0.008 
33 0.008 
32 0.008 
36 0.008 
35 0.008 
34 0.008 
The question of solidarity by way of the welfare state as (a) the question of the average 
amount of income "donated" by an employed person to all social security benefit recipients 
as a percentage of the average income of an employed person and (b) the question of the av-
erage amounf"received" by a benefits recipient from one employed person as a percentage 
of the average income of an employed person 
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (1994) 
The last two columns in Table 12.4 chart the trends just specified for the 
Netherlands in the years from 1952 through 1992. The solidarity given by 
an employed person to all recipients put together was at its peak in 1983, 
dropped rather sharply until1989, and rose somewhat until1992. The sol-
idarity received by one benefit recipient from one employed person was at 
its peak in 1975; it more or less remained at this level until1984, dropped 
sharply in 1985 and remained at this much lower level until1992. Looking 
at the answers to these more clear-cut questions, differences are not large. 
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The one important observation is that the solidarity received by one ben-
efit recipient from one employed person increased until1975, to remain 
at this level until1984. This does not really square with the common as-
sumption that social solidarity kept growing in the Netherlands until the 
mid-1980s. 
Political Effects of Discrepancies Between Two Types of Solidarity 
In a sense, the exercise just performed failed. Although the answer to 
the question when "given" solidarity was at its height differs somewhat 
from the answer to the question on "received" solidarity, differences were 
not large. If they had been important, it would have been worthwhile to 
speculate on the question of what might happen in politics. When will 
employed persons move to the right, when will social security recipients 
move to the left, when will there be a strong electoral polarization? Do 
social benefit recipients move more to the left when the received and given 
solidarity decrease than when the received solidarity decreases? If given 
and received solidarity increase, will the employed react more strongly by 
moving to the right than when only given solidarity increases? I will let 
these questions rest for now. 
Summing Up 
In this chapter, I proposed to state questions on societal characteristics 
in such a way that these questions would involve as much as possible the 
individuals making up a society. I applied this principle when charting 
trends in three aspects of the cohesion of Dutch society during the 20th 
century. These trends were not only mapped with encyclopedic dates, but 
also by administrative statistics and findings from the quantitative analy-
sis of large-scale data-sets. It became clear that current questions are not 
sufficiently attuned to the individual level. In some cases the wrong ques-
tion is being asked, while in other cases the question unwittingly conflates 
several questions into one. 
A point of debate in current sociological theory is the usefulness, when 
answering questions about societal features, of the assumption that indi-
viduals act rationally. This assumption is often made within economics, 
perhaps the most successful social science, and by proponents of a nar-
rowly conceived rational choice approach within sociology. I think the 
prime objection against this approach is not the supposition that people 
behave rationally. The main criticism involves the initial condition under 
which economists traditionally have applied this premise: the prevalence 
of free markets. That is, economics and its little brother in sociology not 
only presuppose a hypothesis about how individuals behave. They also 
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offer a thesis about the societal institutions. Problem articulation, theory 
formation and empirical research in sociology should focus on the latter 
supposition. 
I therefore sympathize with the attempt by many sociologists to "soci-
ologize" the study of markets (White 1981; Granovetter 1985). To begin 
with, free markets never fully prevail. Further, there are organizations 
(duties to perform, and physical punishment meted out by a person at the 
top of n hierarchy). There are also traditions (injunctions to leave things as 
they are through disapproval by bystanders). Beside markets (universal 
rights and financial competition by similar actors), organizations and tra-
ditions are the mechanisms which to some extent coordinate the actions 
of individuals. 
In my opinion, however, these attempts do not go far enough. By an-
alyzing substantive research problems on various aspects of the cohesion 
of Dutch society during the zoth century, I hope to have shown that ad-
ditional progress can be made by applying four specific rules that may 
be viewed as part of a "rational choice approach" or a "rational action 
theory", emphasizing the varying societal situation in which people act. 
To begin with, societal features like cohesion should not be regarded as 
the outcome of one action pursued by individuals, but as the cumulated 
outcome of several kinds of action. Secondly, between persons, within a 
dyad, asymmetric relations are possible. Thirdly, hypotheses should not 
refer to only one type of actor or to two, but to a third party and triads. 
Finally, the actions of individuals do not need to be directed to one good, 
but to two. These principles form not only guidelines for theorizing, but 
also precepts for articulating research questions. 
